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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr.

Latneau timely appeals from the district court's order relinquishing

jurisdiction. The district court initially imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with
two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for Mr. Latneau's guilty plea to attempted
strangulation. On appeal, Mr. Latneau argues that the district court erred when it failed
to inform him that his parental rights could be terminated as a direct consequence of his
guilty plea. Alternatively, Mr. Latneau argues that his procedural and substantive due
process rights were violated when the district court entered a no contact order which
was tantamount to a decree terminating his parental rights. Additionally, Mr. Latneau
argues that that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Latneau was charged with attempted strangulation and misdemeanor
domestic assault and the charging information indicated that the misdemeanor domestic
assault occurred in front of RL. and C.L., which are Mr. Latneau's biological children.
(R, pp.23-24.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Latneau pleaded guilty to the

attempted strangulation charge, and the State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor
domestic assault charge. (06/03/10 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-25.) In the guilty plea advisory form
and at the change of plea hearing, the issue of Mr. Latneau having contact with his
children was not addressed.

(R, pp.40-46; see generally 06/03/10 Tr., pp.5-22.)

Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years
fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R, pp.51-53.)
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At Mr. Latneau's rider review hearing, the State requested that the district court
relinquish jurisdiction and enter a no contact order precluding Mr. Latneau from
communicating with his two biological children, R.L. and C.L. (12/21/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.1820.) Upon review of Mr. Latneau's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the
district court relinquished jurisdiction and entered a no contact order preventing
Mr. Latneau from communicating with his children until June 24, 2017. (R., pp.58-60.)
Mr. Latneau timely appeals. (R., pp.61-64.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court's failure to advise Mr. Latneau that a no contact order
prohibiting his contact with his children could be entered as a direct consequence
of his guilty plea render the no contact order invalid?

2.

Did the district court violate Mr. Latneau's procedural and SUbstantive due
process rights when it entered a no contact order which unduly restricts his
fundamental right to parent?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished its jurisdiction
following Mr. Latneau's rider?

3

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court's Failure To Advise Mr. Latneau That A No Contact Order Prohibiting
His Contact With His Children Could Be Entered As A Direct Consequence Of His Guilty
Plea Rendered The No Contact Order Invalid
A.

Introduction
Before an Idaho court can accept a defendant's guilty plea, Idaho Criminal Rule

11 requires the district court to warn the defendant about the direct consequences of
entering a guilty plea. When a plea is accepted and the only infirmity in that acceptance
is the failure to warn of a particular consequence, any order pertaining to the particular
consequence is invalid.

For example, if a criminal defendant is not warned that

restitution can be order as a consequence of entering a guilty plea, and restitution is
subsequently ordered, that restitution order is invalid.

In this case, Mr. Latneau was

never warned that a no contact order could be entered in regard to his children as a
direct consequence of his guilty plea.

Due to the district court's failure to warn

Mr. Latneau of this consequence, the no contact order is invalid.

B.

The District Court's Failure To Advise Mr. Latneau That A No Contact Order
Prohibiting His Contact With His Children Could Be Entered As A Direct
Consequence Of His Guilty Plea Rendered The No Contact Order Invalid
The following standards govern the acceptance of a plea agreement:
Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must satisfy itself that the
plea is offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The plea must be
entered with "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence." In Idaho, the trial court must follow the minimum
requirements of I.C.R. 11 (c) in accepting pleas of guilty. If the record
indicates the trial court followed the requirements of I.C.R. 11 (c), this is
prima facie showing that the plea is voluntary and knowing.

State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180 (1991) (citing State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443

(Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted). State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 573 (Ct. App.
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1993), held "that restitution is a direct consequence of entering a guilty plea and the
sentencing court may not impose restitution upon a defendant who pleads guilty, unless
defendant is advised of that possibility prior to entering his plea." The Banuelos opinion
went on to note:
Accordingly, we conclude that the order of restitution is invalid in the
absence of the court's advisement before [Mr. Banuelos] pled guilty.
Having previously determined that [Mr. Banuelos'] plea was otherwise
voluntarily and intelligently made, the appropriate remedy is to strike the
order of restitution from the sentence.
Id.

In this case, the district court failed to advise Mr. Latneau at the change of plea

hearing that it could enter a no contact order in regard to his children as a direct
counsequence of his guilty plea. (see generally 06/03/10 Tr., pp.5-22.) Additionally,
there was no reference to a no contact order in the guilty plea advisory form.
(R., pp.40-46.) Since Mr. Latneau was never warned about the possibility of the no
contact order, Mr. Latneau's guilty plea was not entered knowingly and said order is
invalid pursuant to Banuelos, supra, and the appropriate remedy is for this Court to
strike the no contact order.
In sum, in order to accept a knowing guilty plea, the district court must warn the
defendant of the direct consequences of the plea.

In the event a court fails to warn

about a specific consequence of entering guilty plea, and an order pertaining to that
consequence is entered, the order is invalid. Since Mr. Latneau was not warned about
the potential no contact order in regard to his children, the no contact order is invalid.
Accordingly, Mr. Latneau requests that this Court strike the portion of the no contact
order which prevents Mr. Latneau from contacting his children, R.L. and C.L.
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II.

The District Court Violated Mr. Latneau's Procedural And Substantive Due Process
Rights When It Entered A No Contact Order Which Unduly Restricts His Fundamental
Right To Parent
A.

Introduction
Mr. Latneau has a fundamental right to right to parent, or in other words, a liberty

interest in regard to his children. The Idaho legislature recognized the significance of
this liberty interest and codified the Termination of Parental Child Relationship Act
(hereinafter, TPCRA), which sets forth the procedures the State must adhere to in order

to terminate a parent's fundamental right to parent.

When followed, the TPCRA

provides the parent, who is a party subject to the termination proceedings, with notice
and an opportunity for a meaningful hearing, which are the basic requirements for
procedural due process.

In this case, the district court entered a no contact order,

which was tantamount to an order terminating his parental rights, because it prevented
Mr. Latneau from having any contact with his children. Mr. Latneau argues that this
violated his procedural due process rights because he was not given notice before he
entered his guilty plea that the State intended to use his plea to justify the termination of
his parental rights. Additionally, Mr. Latneau argues that jurisdictional review hearing is
not the appropriate forum to litigate parental rights because it does not provide for a
meaningful review of those rights.
If it is determined that Mr. Latneau's procedural due process rights were not
violated at his jurisdictional review hearing, Mr. Latneau argues, in the alternative, that
the no contact order violated his substantive due process rights. Since the right to a
parent is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies, and the district court's no contact order
must be narrowly tailored to reduce its infringement on Mr. Latneau's fundamental right
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to parent while meeting the State's interest in protecting Mr. Latneau's children.
Mr. Latneau submits that the district court could adequately protect his fundamental
right to parent and the State's interests in protecting his children by allowing
Mr. Latneau to have supervised contact with his children.

However, the no contact

order as it stands, is not narrowly tailored because it circumscribes more behavior than
is necessary to protect Mr. Latneau's children.

B.

The District Court Violated Mr. Latneau's Procedural And Substantive Due
Process Rights When It Entered A No Contact Order Which Unduly Restricts
His Fundamental Right To Parent

1.

The District Court Violated Mr. Latneau's Constitutional Right To
Procedural Due Process When It Circumvented The Procedural
Protections Codified In The Termination Of Parent Child And Relationship
Act By Effectively Terminating Mr. Latneau's Parental Rights With A No
Contact Order

The right of parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of
their children has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme
Court as a fundamental right. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Leavitt v.

Leavitt, 142 Idaho 664, 670 (2006).

This liberty interest "does not evaporate simply

because they have not been model parents . . .. Even when blood relationships are
strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their
family life." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) .
The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee due
process of law before the State can deprive a citizen's liberty interest. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art. I, §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
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of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The question then becomes, what process is due? See Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,577 (1975). "The fundamental requirement of due process is the

opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552

(1965)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States Supreme
Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of
Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing Smith v. Idaho
Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768,771 (1996)).

In parental right termination proceedings, the private interests affected by official
action are great.

In fact, the Idaho legislature recognized the importance of parental

rights and procedural due process in regard to those rights when it enacted the TPCRA,
which provides the formal procedures required for terminating parental rights. I.C. § 162001, et seq. One of the basic policies behind the TPCRA follows:

Implicit in this chapter is the philosophy that wherever possible family life
should be strengthened and preserved and that the issue of severing the
parent and child relationship is of such vital importance as to require a
judicial determination in place of attempts at severance by contractual
arrangements, express or implied, for the surrender and relinquishment of
children.
I.C. § 16-2002(2). In order to initiate termination proceedings, a person with an interest
in the child or entity with statutory authorization must file a petition.

I.C. § 16-2004.

After the petition is filed, personal notice of the termination proceedings must be
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provided to the parents of the child. I.C. § 16-2007 (emphasis added). The following
guidelines control the mandatory termination hearing:
The court's finding with respect to grounds for termination shall be based
upon clear and convincing evidence under rules applicable to the trial of
civil causes, provided that relevant and material information of any nature,
including that contained in reports, studies or examinations, may be
admitted and relied upon to the extent of its probative value. When
information contained in a report, study or examination is admitted in
evidence, the person making such report, study or examination shall be
subject to both direct and cross-examination.
I.C. § 16-2009. In the event parental rights are terminated the district court must enter a
written decree which recites "the findings upon which such order is based." I.C. § 162010(1).
In this case, the district court entered a no contact order, which in effect, is the
functional equivalent of a decree terminating parental rights.

The no contact order

prevents Mr. Latneau from contacting his children until June 24, 2017.

(R., pp.58.)

However, the no contact order is even more draconian that a decree terminating
parental rights because Mr. Latneau will incur criminal liability under the no contact
order and as opposed to a termination decree which would not prevent him from
speaking with his children. See I.C. § 18-920(C) ("A violation of a no contact order is
punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in
the county jail not to exceed one (1) year, or both."); compare with I.C. § 16-2011 "An
order terminating the parent and child relationship shall divest the parent and the child
of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obligations, including rights of inheritance, with
respect to each other."). In addition, the no contact order does not sever any duties or
obligations Mr. Latneau has in regard to his children, so he is still liable for child support,
but is criminally liable if he communicates with his children. Therefore, the entry of the
no contact order is tantamount to a decree terminating parental rights, but entails
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harsher consequences than a termination decree alone because Mr. Latneau cannot
speak with his children but is still potentially liable for their financial well being.
The use of a no contact order in lieu of a formal termination proceeding does not
comport with the basic principles of procedural due process. As stated above, both
basic due process and the TRCAP require that a parent receive notice that the State is
going to attempt to deprive a liberty interest.

Here, Mr. Latneau was not informed prior

to the change of plea hearing that his plea could be used as a justification to terminate
his parental rights. (see generally 06/03/10 Tr., p.5-22; R., ppAO-46.)

While the guilty

plea advisory form did mention, as a consequence for pleading guilty, that Mr. Latneau
might be required to pay restitution and temporarily lose his ability to sit on a jury panel,
the guilty advisory form did not mention that the State would seek a no contact order,
which is in effect for approximately six and one-half years, in regard to his children as a
consequence of his guilty plea. (R., ppAO-46, 58.)

Therefore, Mr. Latneau was not

provided with notice that his guilty plea could later be used as a justification to terminate
his parental rights.
Even if it is determined that Mr. Latneau received enough notice to meet state
and federal due process requirements, the use of a jurisdictional review hearing in lieu
of a formal termination proceeding violates the meaningful hearing requirement of
procedural due process. Section I.C. § 16-2009 of the Idaho Code, sets forth the right
to have a termination hearing prior to the entry of a termination decree. Since the Idaho
legislature proved a specific right to a hearing prior to a termination proceeding, a denial
of that hearing constitutes a unique denial of due process. See Lightner v. Hardison,
149 Idaho 712, 718 (Ct. App. 2010) ("When the language of state statutes and
regulations create a right, that right is entitled due process protection.") (citing
10

Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (9th Cir.1992) ) (holding that the
termination of visiting privileges violated due process where the prison regulation
contained explicit mandatory language that visiting privileges could be suspended only
after a finding of guilt); see also Taylor v. Armantrout, 894 F.2d 961, 964-65 (8th Cir.
1989) (holding that a regulation that stated that people whose names appeared on a list
"shall" be allowed to visit created a right to visitation entitled to due process protection).
The use of a jurisdictional review hearing to address Mr. Latneau's parental
rights did not function as an adequate alternative to an I.C. § 16-2009 hearing because
the jurisdictional review hearings have significantly lower evidentiary standards than
hearings held pursuant to I.C. § 16-2009. The Idaho Legislature set forth the following
procedures to govern a formal termination hearing:
The court's finding with respect to grounds for termination shall be based
upon clear and convincing evidence under rules applicable to the trial of
civil causes, provided that relevant and material information of any nature,
including that contained in reports, studies or examinations, may be
admitted and relied upon to the extent of its probative value. When
information contained in a report, study or examination is admitted in
evidence, the person making such report, study or examination shall be
subject to both direct and cross-examination.
I.C. § 16-2009.

In a formal termination proceeding, the court must use a clear and

convincing evidence standard, which is higher than the normal civil preponderance of
the evidence standard. See Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007, 1001 (Ct. App. 1985)
(Clear and convincing evidence is a higher evidentiary standard than preponderance of
the evidence). Additionally, the rules of evidence apply at a termination proceeding.
I.C. § 16-2009. Conversely, at a jurisdictional review hearing, since criminal liability has
already been determined, the rules of evidence do not apply and the district court has a
very broad range of discretion to consider evidence not admissible at trial. Concerning
this issue the Idaho Court of Appeals noted:
11

After a criminal defendant's guilt has been established, the trial court has
greater latitude regarding the information that it may consider for
sentencing than could have been considered while the state was
attempting to establish that guilt at trial. The rules of evidence do not apply
to sentencing proceedings. The trial court, therefore, has broad discretion
in the admission of evidence at a sentencing proceeding and properly may
consider a wide range of relevant evidence in determining an appropriate
sentence for the particular defendant before it. Moreover, it is essential
that the trial court receive a/l information available about the defendant
before imposing sentence so that such sentence will reflect the character
and propensity of the defendant as well as the circumstances of the
offense.
State v. Hoover, 138 Idaho 414,422 (Ct. App. 2003).

Due to the lower evidentiary standards at a jurisdictional review hearing, the
State was able to submit evidence in support of the no contact order, which it would not
have been able to submit at a formal termination hearing. At the jurisdictional review
hearing, for example, Mrs. Latneau provided a victim impact statement, which was
replete with prejudicial information that would not have been admissible under the rules
of evidence.

For example, character evidence in the form of prior bad acts was

admitted when the victim asserted that Mr. Latneau slit the truck on the Mrs. Latneau's
tire, abused their children. (12/21/10 Tr., p.2, Ls.15-21.) Additionally the victim made
speculative assertions that their children did not want to see Mr. Latneau. (12/21/10
Tr., p.3, Ls.4-8.)

Since these assertions were made in the form of a victim impact

statement, Mr. Latneau was denied the ability to cross examine the witness, an
opportunity which would have been provided at a formal termination proceeding. See
I.C. § 16-2009.

Moreover, Mr. Latneau lost his ability to cross examine the mental

health evaluator and the PSI evaluator. I.C. § 16-2009 ("When information contained in
a report, study or examination is admitted in evidence, the person making such report,
study or examination shall be subject to both direct and cross-examination.").
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In sum, Mr. Latneau has a fundamental right to parent, which is considered a
liberty interest in the context of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.

The Idaho

Legislature provided for specific procedures Idaho courts must adhere to in order to
legally terminate this right. In this case, that procedure was abandoned and the district
court entered a no contact order, which had, in effect, terminated Mr. Latneau's parental
rights. Since Mr. Latneau was not informed about this consequence at the change of
plea hearing he did not receive adequate notice.

Moreover, a jurisdictional review

hearing did not provide Mr. Latneau with a meaningful opportunity to be heard
concerning the termination of his parental rights.

Therefore the district court's no

contact order violated Mr. Latneau's procedural due process rights and should be struck
by this Court.

2.

The District Court's No Contact Order Violated Mr. Latneau's Fundamental
Right To Parent Because A Less Restrictive Means To Protect His
Children Exists

Mr. Latneau asserts that the no-contact order unconstitutionally interferes with
his fundamental right to parent, which is a substantive due process right. Since the right
to a parent is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies, and the district court's no contact
order must be narrowly tailored to meet the State's interest in protecting Mr. Latneau's
children.

Mr. Latneau submits that the district court could adequately protect his

children by ordering supervised contact instead of an absolute no contact order.
The right of parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of
their children has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme
Court as a fundamental right. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Leavitt v.
Leavitt, 142 Idaho 664, 670 (2006).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment has a substantive component which provides heightened protections
13

against governmental interference where fundamental rights and liberty interests are at
stake. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children is "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests," recognized
by the courts. Id. This interest includes the right of parents to "establish a home and
bring up children." Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). A strict
prohibition against a parent having any contacts whatsoever with his or her child is
necessarily an interference with this fundamental right. As such, the imposition of the
no contact order issued in this case is subject to the strict requirements of substantive
due process since the terms of that order interfere with Mr. Latneau's fundamental
rights as a parent.
The Idaho Supreme Court has established that the State may not interfere with
the exercise of the fundamental rights of a parent absent clear and convincing proof that
the State's action is necessary for the protection or best interests of the child. In the
Interests of Doe, 144 Idaho 534 (2007) (State action terminating a parent's rights must

be supported by clear and convincing evidence); Leavitt, 142 Idaho at 670, 132 P.3d at
427 (applying clear and convincing evidence standard to decisions regarding the
visitation rights of grandparents); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-748
(1982). Here, the district court made a factual finding that Mr. Latneau's children have
been adversely affected by his actions. (12/21/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.21-24.) In coming to this
conclusion, the district court relied on the manner in which Mr. Latneau treated his wife,
but it did not base this conclusion on any his interactions Mr. Latneau had with his
children. (12/21/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.21-24.) The district court went on to State that the
existence of the no contact order and the impact it has on his parental rights was
contingent upon his potential divorce decree. (12/21/10 Tr., p.27.) The record does not
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contain clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Latneau should not have contact with his
children.
Additionally, when the State infringes upon a fundamental liberty interest, that
infringement must be narrowly tailored to meet the State's interest. According to the
United State's Supreme Court, "the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of
'due process of law' to include a substantive component, which forbids the government
to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (citing Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986» (emphasis
in original).

While, the State does have a compelling interest in the protection of

Mr. Latneau's children, Mr. Latneau submits that severing all contact between him and
his children constitutes an overly restrictive means to achieve that end.

Mr. Latneau

should be allowed to have supervised visitation rights with his children. The State can
have a third party monitor and be present during his visits to ensure that Mr. Latneau
acts appropriately or engage in other practices that will protect the children. Since there
is a less restrictive means to achieve the State's interest, the no contact order is not
narrowly tailored, and, therefore, violates his substantive due process rights.
In light of the fact that clear and convincing evidence was not presented that the
no contact order was necessary for the protection of Mr. Latneau's children and since
supervised visits are sufficient to meet the State's interest in protecting his children, the
State has violated Mr. Latneau's fundamental rights as a parent by entering a no
contact order severing and criminalizing all contacts with his children.
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III.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Its Jurisdiction Following
Mr. Latneau's Rider

A.

Introduction
The IDOC recommended that Mr. Latneau be placed on probation.

The

Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) investigator recommended that
Mr. Latneau be placed on probation.

When this is viewed in light of the mitigating

factors it supports the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished its jurisdiction.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Its Jurisdiction
Following Mr. Latneau's Rider

1.

The District Court's Factual Finding That Mr. Latneau's Disposition Of His
Property Constituted Illegal Or Bad Behavior Was Clearly Erroneous

Before relinquishing jurisdiction, the district court made an unsupported factual
finding pertaining to the disposition of Mr. Latneau's property located in the State of
Arizona. This Court has held, "[f]indings are clearly erroneous only when unsupported
by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 557, 560 (Ct. App.
2005) (citing State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 686 (Ct. App. 1999). Idaho appellate
courts will overturn a district court's factual findings if they are clearly erroneous. (See
State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 75 (2000).

The district court's implied conclusion that Mr. Latneau acted either illegally or
inappropriately in regard to his chattel property located in Arizona was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence.

Mr. Latneau owned two homes in Arizona and

Mr. Latneau had given his brother permission or a license to enter those homes and
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remove any chattel property contained thereon.

(PSI, pp.99-105; 12/21/10 Tr., p.8,

Ls.9-20; See Tanner Companies v. Arizona State Land Dept., 142 Ariz. 183, 193
(Ct. App. 1984). ("A license is an authority or permission to do a particular act or series
of acts upon the land of another without possessing any interest or estate in such land."
(citations omitted)). Mr. Latneau's brother did some chattel property from the homes.
(12/21/10 Tr., p.8, LS.9-25.)
Throughout the course of the jurisdictional review hearing there were various
unsupported assumptions made about Mr. Latneau's property by both the State and the
district court.

The State initially characterized Mr. Latneau's actions in regard to the

homes in Arizona as "conspiracy to commit grand theft" because it was marital property.
(12/21/10 Tr., p.8, L.9 - p.9, L.13.)

the district court made the following statement

concerning this issue:
I don't know if you saw the jail conversations. They're not actually word
for word. Basically they say what you said. So I don't know quite what to
think about them. To me, I am looking at the investigator's report and jail
conferences. There is certainly some reasonable inferences that you
were involved in that kind of conduct to try and get items sold. You
needed money.
And I understand the home was in foreclosure so your wife and
children were not living there. I don't know if they plan on going back
there. I don't know that happened to all the marital property. I assume
your personal items were moved from the house.
(12/21/10 Tr., p.24, Ls.3-17.)

These assertions are unsupported because they

presuppose that the property at question was martial or community property. Absent a
valid judgment, there is no way to any party could ascertain the nature of the property
interests involved. This assumption is not supported by evidence because the record
does not indicate specifically what was removed, if the property was obtained during the
duration of the community, and even if it was, whether it falls into one of Arizona's
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statutory exceptions to community property. For example, Section 25-211 of the Arizona
Revised Statutes, state that property obtained acquired by gift, devise or descent is not
community property even though it was obtained during the existence of the community.
Since there was no legal division of the community assets the property at issue could
have been Mr. Latneau's separate property, and any assertion it was community
property could not be supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Additionally, the record indicates that a divorce proceeding had been filed, but it
does not indicate in which state it was filed.

(12/21/10 Tr., p.24, L.12 - p.25, L.1.)

There could be choice of law issues, whether Idaho or Arizona laws apply, and
jurisdictional issues if the divorce action was filed in Idaho.
In the event the property at issue is in fact community property, and Arizona law
controls, Mr. Latneau's actions might not have been illegal because either spouse has
the ability to sell community property, prior to the service of a petition for dissolution of
marriage.

See A.R.S. § 25-214(C) ("Either spouse separately may acquire, manage,

control or dispose of community property or bind the community, except that joinder of
both spouses is required ... , after service of a petition for dissolution of marriage, legal
separation or annulment if the petition results in a decree of dissolution of marriage,
legal separation or annulment .... ")
In addition, the district court also implicitly asserted that Mr. Latneau had property
removed from his homes in Arizona to defraud creditors. (12/21/10 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-19.)
This implicit assumption was not support by substantial and competent evidence
because the record contains no evidence that the creditors at issue had any interests in
the property removed from the Arizona homes. Again, a choice of law issues arises and
a legal determination of the nature of the property interests at issue would need to be
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made in order to conclude that Mr. Latneau's creditors had any cognizable interests in
the property removed. For example, the district court asked Mr. Latneau if any fixtures
had been removed from the homes upon his requests. (12/21/10 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-13.)
In both Idaho and Arizona, the defining property as a "fixture" requires a legal
determination. See A.R.S. § 47-9102; See also I.C. § 28-9-102.
In sum, the record does not contain enough information to make any
assumptions about Mr. Latneau's disposition of his property in Arizona.

Any

conclusions about his actions are clearly erroneous because the record is bereft of
substantial or competent evidence to support said conclusions.

2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Its
Jurisdiction Following Mr. Latneau's Rider

The decision to relinquish jurisdiction lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837,837 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing to State v. Lee, 117
Idaho 203, 205-06 (Ct. App.1990).

"When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on

appeal, the appellate court conducts a mUlti-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry
is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600

(1989) (citing to Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603,605 (Ct. App.1987)
). Mr. Latneau does not contest whether the district court appropriately perceived its
ability to relinquish jurisdiction as one of discretion. However, Mr. Latneau does contest
that the district court acted outside of the outer boundaries of its discretion and that it
did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
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As

a

preliminary

note,

Mr.

Latneau

received

two

separate

probation

recommendations one in the PSI and one in the APSI - both of which were presented to
the district court after Mr. Latneau completed his rider. (PSI, pp.24, 26.) The district
court received the PSI after Mr. Latneau completed his rider because the PSI was
created during Mr. Latneau's rider and his performance on the rider was considered by
the district court and both parties as part of the presentences process.
Tr., p.8, Ls.4-12; 06/24/10 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-20.)

(06/03/10

The rider review hearing could be

characterized as a hybrid sentencing hearing and a rider review hearing. With that in
mind, Mr. Latneau is a viable candidate for probation because he received two
probation recommendations from professionals specifically tasked with evaluating his
amenability to rehabilitation and the risk he poses to society.
In addition to the foregoing probation recommendations, there are various
mitigating factors which support the conclusion that Mr. Latneau is amenable to
rehabilitation and does not pose a significant risk to society. Specifically, Mr. Latneau
has family support. In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that support of family and friends were mitigating factors.

Here,

Mr. Latneau's mother will allow him to stay at her Arizona residence when he is
released from custody.

(PSI, p.20.)

His mother will also send him money for living

expense until he can get transferred from Idaho to Arizona. (PSI, p.20.) In addition,
Mr. Latneau has enough personal savings to support him for approximately one year
after his release from custody.

(PSI, p.126.)

Mr. Latneau's family support and his

personal savings reduce any risk he poses to society because he will have no incentive
to engage in any financially motive offenses upon his release from custody.
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Additionally, in state v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996), it was
deemed appropriate to consider a defendant's employment background as a mitigating
factor.

Here, Mr. Latneau has been self-employed for over a decade, installing

residential and commercial air quality systems. (PSI, p.22.)

Mr. Latneau characterized

this business as lucrative. (PSI, p.22.) This is evinced by the fact that, Mr. Latneau has
saved enough money to support himself for a year. (PSI, p.22.) Mr. Latneau's work
ethic is also evidenced by the fact that he earned his G.E.O., performed over eighty
hours of community service, and completed his assigned programming all while on his
rider. (PSI, pp.22, 30.) The IOOC stated the following about Mr. Latneau's community
service:
Mr. Latneau additionally completed over (80) hours of community service
while at NICI. Offenders are tasked with developing a plan to use their
Besides studying his
time in a productive and prosocial manner.
programs, Mr. Latneau was able to volunteer and work with others on the
compound to stay busy and be an active participant in his own life. This is
important as many offenders will perform the minimum requirements and
never aspire to succeed beyond expectation.
(PSI, p.30.)
Additionally, Mr. Latneau's substance addiction is a mitigating factor. The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that substance addiction is a mitigating factor. State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89 (1982). Mr. Latneau admitted that he is an alcoholic. (PSI, p.22.) The
district court did not consider Mr. Latneau's substance addiction as a mitigating factor,
and implicitly stated it was an aggravating factor.

(12/21/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.21-24.)

Therefore, the district court erred when it considered Mr. Latneau's substance addiction
as an aggravating factor.
Further, Mr. Latneau's mental health is a mitigating factor. In State v. Payne, 146
Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held that even in instances where
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there is no nexus between a crime and the defendant's mental health issue(s), mental
health evidence is relevant to sentence mitigation. Mr. Latneau has been diagnosed
with bi-polar disorder and was not medicated for this illness when he committed the
underling offense. (PSI, p.31.) The potential for a nexus between the commission of
the offense and his unmediated bi-polar disorder was so great the IDOC recommended
that he obtain a mental health evaluation. (PSI, p.31.) The district court decided to
continue the rider review hearing so a mental health evaluation could be prepared.
(12/02/10 Tr., p.26, L.6 - p.29, L.1.)

While the mental health evaluator disagreed with

the bi-polar diagnoses, it did conclude that Mr. Latneau suffered from mental health
issues. (PSI, pp.128-29.)
Finally, the fact that this is Mr. Latneau's first felony conviction is a mitigating
factor. (PSI, p.23.) In State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 206, (Ct. App. 1990), the Idaho
Court of Appeals considered a defendant's first felony offense as a mitigating factor.
In light of the two probation recommendations and the mitigating factors, the
district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Latneau respectfully requests that this Court strike the no contact order in
regard to his children R.L. and C.L. Additionally, Mr. Latneau respectfully requests that
this Court place Mr. Latneau probation and remand this case with instructions for the
district court order terms of probation it deems appropriate.
DATED this 20 th day of December, 2011.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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